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HUMAN EMBRYO, ANIMAL EMBRYO,
CHIMERICAL EMBRYO:
WHAT LEGAL STATUS IN FRENCH LAW?
Laurence Brunet ∗ & Sonia Desmoulin†∗
INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the scientific review Science published an experiment
studying the development of human cell nuclei introduced into
bovine enucleated cells. In an article entitled The Minotaur in
Gestation in a Laboratory of Massachusetts, the French newspaper
Le Monde questioned the legality of such research in France, as
well as the status of the life which may arise from this
experimentation. 1 Surprisingly, the article provoked little reaction.
Less than ten years later, in 2007, Le Figaro–another French
newspaper–caused a stir with an article announcing, Soon Embryos
Half-Man Half-Animal. 2 Between these two dates, some important
changes had taken place in France and in other countries.
In France, the law pertaining to the use of human embryos for
scientific research has been modified. Indeed, the law of August
6th, 2004 authorized by exception, and for a limited period of five
years, experimentation on human embryos. 3
At the same time, outside France, the issue concerning the
creation of chimeras or hybrid embryos (composed of human and
animal elements) raised some public concerns. In Canada, the
Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA) of 2004 defined a
∗

Centre de Recherche “Droit, Sciences et Techniques,” Université Paris I
Panthéon-Sorbonne (UMR 8103). Ms. Brunet wrote section 1.
†
Centre de Recherche “Droit, Sciences et Techniques,” Université Paris I
Panthéon-Sorbonne (UMR 8103). Ms. Desmoulin wrote sections 2 and 3.
1. LE MONDE, November 14th, 1998.
2. Martine Perez, Bientôt des embryons mi-homme mi-animal, LE FIGARO,
September 9th, 2007. See also, Jean-Yves Nau, Chimères humaines et
démocratie, LE MONDE, February 23rd, 2007.
3. Act n° 2004-800, August 6th, 2004, JORF August 7th, 2004. See also, H.
Gaumont-Prat, La révision des lois de bioéthique et la recherche sur les cellules
souches embryonnaires, 12 REVUE LAMY DROIT CIVIL 27(2005) ; and also, Ph.
Pédrot & B. Pauvert, La législation applicable aux cellules souches
embryonnaires, 35 PETITES AFFICHES 77 (2005).
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“hybrid,” as “an ovum of a non-human life form into which the
nucleus of a human cell has been introduced,” 4 and stated that “no
person shall knowingly . . . create a hybrid for the purpose of
reproduction, or transplant a hybrid into either a human being or a
non-human life form.” 5 Furthermore, three of the main Canadian
federal granting agencies in Human Health and research6 adopted
guidelines which set down, first, that “it is not ethically acceptable
to create, or intend to create, hybrid individuals by such means as
mixing human and animal gametes, or transferring somatic or germ
cell nuclei between cells of humans and other species;” and
second, that “it is not ethically acceptable to undertake research
that involves ectogenesis, cloning human beings by any means
including somatic cell nuclear transfer, formation of animal/human
hybrids, or the transfer of embryos between humans and other
species.” 7
The United Kingdom also had to face this issue: the Human
Fertility and Embryology Authority (HFEA) received two
applications from scientific teams to carry out research using
human cells and animal eggs to produce stem cells. The
explanation for such applications can be found in the lack of
available human oocytes for scientific research on embryo
development. The regulatory body decided that, under current
British law, it was not in a position to authorize such an
experiment, and considered it necessary for British citizens to pass
on the social acceptability of such experiments. Therefore, a
public consultation was launched in 2007 8 and the Science and
Technology Select Committee released, in April 2007, a report on
“Government Proposals for the Regulation of Hybrid and Chimera

4. Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHRA), 2004, Section 3
(d).
5. AHRA, Section 5 (1) (j).
6. Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and
Engineering Research Council of Canada, Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada.
7. Article 9.5 Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research
Involving Humans 1998 ("TCPS" with 2000, 2002, and 2005 amendments),
http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/english/policystatement/policy
available
at
statement.cfm (last visited November 6, 2008).
8. See, Public Dialogue, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/en/1517.html#dialogue
(last visited November 6, 2008).
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Embryos.” 9 The Committee opined “that the creation of humananimal chimera or hybrid embryos, and specifically cytoplasmic
hybrid embryos, is necessary for research” but “that development
of human-animal chimera or hybrid embryos past the 14-day stage
should be prohibited and that a prohibition should be put in place
on the implantation of human-animal chimera or hybrid embryos
in a woman.” Since then, the HFEA decided to give limited
approval, on a case-by-case basis, for certain scientific research
projects involving the creation of hybrids or chimerical embryos in
vitro. In November 2007, a proposal to update the Human
Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990, concerning assisted
conception and the use of embryos in research and therapy, was
introduced before Parliament. The new Bill became an Act of the
Parliament on November 13th, 2008. It supports a pragmatic legal
framework by prohibiting placing “in a woman an embryo other
than a human embryo, an inter-species embryo, or any gametes
other than human gametes.” Mixing human gametes with animal
gametes, bringing about the creation of an inter-species embryo, or
keeping or using an inter-species embryo is prohibited without a
license issued by the HEFA. This inter-species embryo cannot be
kept after either “the appearance of the primitive streak,” or “the
end of the period of 14 days beginning with the day on which the
process of creating the inter-species embryo.” 10
Such a legal framework still does not exist in France.
Nevertheless, as with their foreign colleagues, French scientists
specializing in cloning, genetics engineering and embryology
begin to express interest in this field. Therefore, French lawyers,
already facing the tricky issue of defining the legal status of human
embryos, now have to determine the legal status of chimerical or
hybrid embryos, resulting from the mixing of human and animal
cells.
9. House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, Government
Proposals for the Regulation of Hybrid and Chimera Embryos, Fifth
report
of
Session
2006-07,
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmsctech/272/27
2i.pdf (last visited November 6, 2008).
10. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [HL], Amending the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act
1990,
Section 4A, available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldbills/006/08006.17.html#j254 (last visited November 6, 2008).
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The question of the legal status of the chimerical embryo
reveals other disturbing issues in French law, which appears
clearly to anyone familiar with the French legal system.
First, it is structured around a summa divisio, distinguishing
two fundamental categories and regimes: persons and things,
subjects and objects. Traditionally, these fundamental categories
defined themselves in reference–and in opposition–to each other.
Without precise legal definitions, French authors tried to define
these concepts and suggested that the French word chose,
translated roughly as thing, should apply to anything existing in the
human world, whether or not it is likely to be appropriated. As
regards les personnes–persons–as said by a renowned French
Professor of Law, “we are accustomed to institutions; we don’t
need to define them.” 11 In fact, the category of persons is closed,
while the category of things is residual. The latter absorbs what
the former rejects.
Consequently, because of their
interdependence, neither of these categories can be simply
understood. Nevertheless, the need for such a distinction has
always been clear for lawyers.
Several distinguishing criteria have thus been brought out: a
person is characterized by the ability to act in the judicial system
(by judicial deeds and trials), by the capacity to be the subject of
rights and duties, by the capacity to exercise such rights, and also
by what is known as “patrimony” in traditional civilian doctrine. 12
In this way, the legal concept of person is a tool to identify actors
(subjects) of the legal system by their opposition to objects over
which rights are exercised. But the distinction also brings with it a
symbolic dimension: the actors are invested with a supreme
importance. Here the ancient influence of Christianity and its
insistence on the importance of individuality is to be stressed.
Catholicism is the first religion to emphasize the importance of
terrestrial experience as opposed to a purely extra-terrestrial
attitude. The consideration for the autonomy of the individual, and
for its self-sufficiency, was further enhanced with the spread of the
Protestantism. To be complete, the humanist philosophy has also
emphasized the self-sufficiency of the individual as a rational
11. J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL, INTRODUCTION n. 23 (PUF, Thémis
1999).
12. Patrimony: the economic unit consisting of the total sum of a person’s
assets and liabilities.
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entity, with or without any connection with God. In short, one can
grasp the legal concept of person (and judicial personality), on the
one hand, as a functional and instrumental tool, and on the other
hand, as a symbolic institution with religious and humanist roots.
Second, despite–or perhaps because of–this symbolic
dimension, the legal concept of person could not perfectly
correspond to flesh and blood people. We remember, of course,
the slavery statute, not abolished until 1848 in France. Slaves in
French colonies were governed by the regime of goods and things
(Le Code noir, 1685). 13 French law also had what was called mort
civile–civil death–which was not abolished until 1854. It was a
sentence passed on persons convicted to hard labor or life
imprisonment. The “civilly dead” person lost all his possessions.
His legacy was passed on, as if he had died, and his marriage was
dissolved. Since then, the progression of the idea of inherent rights
and that of equality narrowed the gap between a person in the legal
sense of words and an actual human being. The adherence of these
two concepts was sought. It could be the reason why the concept
of natural person appeared in the Louisiana Civil Code, 14 while the
concept of physical persons was acknowledged in the French civil
doctrine. At the same time, the legal concept of a person was
divided to accommodate the concept of a juridical person, which
seems to be more open in the Louisiana Civil Code than in the
French law (in which this category covers almost only corporations
and associations). With this evolution arose the idea that all
individuals must be understood as persons in the legal sense. This
movement deepened in Europe after the Second World War with
the promotion of human rights and the stigmatization of crimes
against humanity. The adoption of the European Convention for
Human Rights (ECHR), 15 in the framework of the European
Council and the creation of a special court–the European Court for
Human Rights–in charge of judging violations of the convention
by member states and individuals, were important events. The fact
that any individual who claims to be a victim of a violation of
13. CODES NOIRS: DE L'ESCLAVAGE AUX ABOLITIONS, LE CODE NOIR DE
1685, EDIT DU ROI SUR LES ESCLAVES DES ILES DE L'AMERIQUE (Dalloz
2006).
14. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 24 (West 2008).
15. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(Rome, November 4th, 1950).
MARS
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rights protected by the ECHR can complain to the Court (under the
condition that all legal recourses within national Law must have
been exhausted) plays a central role in the strengthening of human
rights. Furthermore, the Court has significant influence to the
effect that most national laws have been modified towards a
greater respect for human rights.
There is undoubtedly in Europe, since the middle of the 20th
century, a movement of convergence between the different
conceptual tools described: human rights, amplified and
consolidated by the ECHR, reinforce the idea that the judicial
personality, in his dual dimension–instrumental and symbolic–is
the person’s primary source of protection. But recent advances in
biotechnology and the scientific interest in manipulating human
genome, cells and embryos, disrupt this progression. In general,
the substantial unity and the identity of the person are strikingly
challenged in medical investigations and genetic explorations that
try to reengineer human components. Scientific applications to
experiment on human embryos and mix human and animal
components shed a harsh light on the blurred frontiers of humanity.
Indeed, the very concept of humanity was philosophically
constructed in opposition to that of animalism, and animals belong
to the residual category of things in the civil tradition. 16 At the
same time, the legal notion of humanity is challenged by a new
concept of “human species,” as in article 16-4 of the French Civil
Code. 17 This concept of “human species” is closer to biology and
zoology than to law. In this context, the relations between human
beings (and humanity), the legal category of persons (individuals
with judicial personality) and legal protection have to be
reconsidered. In this paper, we propose to reexamine these
problematic relations through the emerging question of the legal
status of the chimerical or hybrid embryo resulting from mixing
human and animal cells.
As there is no specific French jurisprudence, nor legal text,
regarding chimerical embryos mixing human and animal cells, a
practical way to anticipate may be to combine solutions dealing
with human and animal embryos. Therefore, in order to illuminate
the legal status of chimerical embryos, we will proceed in three
16. See F. BURGAT, ANIMAL: MON PROCHAIN (Odile Jacob ed., 1997).
17. French Civil Code, art. 16-4: “nobody can interfere with the integrity of
the human species.”
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steps. First, we will expose the current status of human embryos in
French law. We will then clarify the legal status of animal
embryos in France. Finally, we will discuss chimerical embryos
and will propose some primary hypotheses.
I. HUMAN EMBRYOS
Given the strong protective dimension that has historically
been associated with the legal notion of the person (e.g., with
general legal capacity), the protections given to the human fetus
and embryo are co-extensive with their legal characterization. The
question is whether they can be viewed as belonging to the
category of the person. To clarify this issue, we first must address
the in utero embryo and fetus, and second, the in vitro embryo.
Traditionally the question is connected to the ancient Roman
fiction of the anticipated personality of the unborn child for the
preservation of its interests. This idea is not formally mentioned in
any provision of the French Civil Code. This is a primary
difference with the Louisiana Civil Code, in which article 26 states
that “an unborn child shall be considered as a natural person for
whatever relates to its interests for the moment of conception.”
Besides in French law this rule has a strictly patrimonial
understanding and therefore is does not offer a considerate status to
the unborn child, namely, a protection adjusted to the humanity of
the fetus.
The question of the fetus’s nature, or status, first arose in a
socially controversial context, at the time of the vote on the French
Law n° 75-17 of January 17th, 1975, authorizing the voluntary
interruption of pregnancy. 18 This law operated a compromise. It
made it clear in article 1 that “The law secures the primacy of the
person, prohibits any assault on human dignity and guarantees the
respect of every human being from the beginning of life. The
principle may only be derogated from in the event of necessity and
in accordance with the conditions set out by this law.” It was a
matter of finding a delicate equilibrium between the principal of
respect for all human beings from the moment of conception, and
the exception or justification admitted in the case of distress of a
pregnant woman. The law therefore did not recognize in 1975 the
18. Until then, intentional abortion had been sanctioned by French law,
except in cases where it was necessary in order to save the life of the mother.
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right to abortion. It recognized simply that under certain
circumstances the criminal sanction could be removed. The law,
manipulating the concepts of principle and exception, in this way
avoided taking a position on the characterization of the fetus as
either person or thing.
The recent reform of the abortion law has slightly modified the
former equilibrium. 19 The period in which abortion was permitted
was extended to twelve weeks instead of the ten weeks previously
provided. In addition, the physician’s duty to assess the mother
distress was diminished. More importantly, the provisions relating
to criminal offence in case of abortion have disappeared in the
Criminal Code. All of the law’s provisions regulating voluntary
abortion have now been enacted in the Public Health Code. This
modification reinforces the woman’s freedom to abort.
The Constitutional Council acted similarly when it held that the
law conforms with the French Constitution. 20 This amounted to a
ratification by the Council of this equilibrium and to a refusal to
give constitutional value to the idea of respect for all human beings
from the moment of conception.
Some time afterward, the National Consultative Ethics
Committee (NCEE) issued an opinion on the sampling of dead
human embryonic and fetal tissue for therapeutic, diagnostic, and
scientific purposes (opinion n° 1, May 22nd, 1984). The NCEE is
an independent authority with the mission to give opinions on
ethical problems and questions concerning society, revealed by the
progress of knowledge in the fields of biology, medicine and
health. The Committee opined that the embryo is “a potential
human person.” This expression is ambivalent: the embryo is not
yet a person, but it has the elements of a person, and must be
protected as one.

19. Law n° 2001-588, July 4th, 2001, revising the Public Health Code, arts.
L. 2212-1 to 2212-11.
20. Decision n° 74-54, January 15th, 1975, available at http://www.conseilconstitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/depuis1958/decisions-par-date/1975/74-54-dc/decision-n-74-54-dc-du-15janvier1975.7423.html (last visited November 6, 2008).
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Authors 21 have steadily proposed the creation of a new
subclass within the category of person to find an adequate
protection for embryos. Most of them have suggested splitting the
concept of person between, on the one hand, the functional and
abstract notion of person and, on the other hand, a more flexible
notion of human being. According to the authors, this reasoning
was justified by the 1994 bioethics laws. 22 It is thus provided
under article 16-1 of the French Civil Code that “the law secures
the primacy of the person, prohibits any assault on human dignity
and guarantees the respect of every human being from the
beginning of its life.” 23 It has been noted that this law was
intended to add a new feature to the concept of person, its human
dimension, and more particularly to add this new feature to the
embryo.
An additional justification for this idea of a new sub-class was
also found in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of
Biology and Medicine, also known as the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine, which was opened for signature on April
4th, 1997 in Oviedo and came into force on December 1st, 1999.
Article 1 provides that the “Parties to this Convention shall protect
the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee
everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and
other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the
application of biology and medicine.” This passage is explained in
the Convention’s accompanying explanatory report on the
Convention, which states that “the Convention also uses the
expression ‘human being’ to state the necessity to protect the
dignity and identity of all human beings. It was acknowledged that
it was a generally accepted principle that human dignity and the
identity of the human being had to be respected as soon as life

21. S. Joly, Le passage de la personne, sujet de droit à la personne, être
humain, 22 DROIT DE LA FAMILLE (see the recording of references in n. 51)
(1997); and P. Murat, Réflexions sur la distinction être humain/personne, 9
DROIT DE LA FAMILLE (1997).
22. Laws n° 94-653 and n° 94-654, July 29th, 1994. New provisions were
added in both the French Civil Code and Public Health Code.
23. One can notice that it is nearly the same wording as in the 1975 law
(authorizing voluntary abortion), art. 1.
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began.” 24 However, in 2008, France had not yet ratified the
Convention.
Moreover this attempt to give a juridical protection to in utero
fetus was ruined by criminal court cases applying article 221-6 of
the French Criminal Code. Indeed, on three occasions, the Cour de
cassation (hereafter, Court of Cassation)–the French highest court
for private law cases–stated that: “the rule that offences and
punishment must be defined by law, which requires that criminal
statutes be construed strictly, pleads against a charge of
unintentional homicide lying in the case of a child that is not born
alive.” 25
In one of the Court of Cassation decisions dated June 30th,
1999, an application against the French Republic was lodged with
the European Court of Human Rights. It was a case of mistaken
24. The Convention does not define the term ‘everyone’ (in French ‘toute
personne’). These two terms are equivalent and found in the English and French
versions of the European Convention on Human Rights, which however does
not define them. In the absence of a unanimous agreement on the definition of
these terms among member States of the Council of Europe, it was decided to
allow domestic law to define them for the purposes of the application of the
present Convention.
25. D. Vignaud, Note, Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle, 30 juin
1999, RECUEIL DALLOZ 710 (1999); Y. Mayaud, Entre vie et mort, la protection
pénale du foetus, 4 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE 813 (1999); and M.-L
Rassat, La victime des infractions contre les personnes après l'arrêt de la
Chambre criminelle du 30 juin 1999, 12 DROIT PENAL 4 (2000).
Y. Mayaud, Note on Cour de cassation, Assemblée plénière, 29 juin 2001,
RECUEIL DALLOZ 2917 (2001); P. Sargos, Rapport, J. Sainte-Rose, Conclusions,
and M.-L. Rassat, Note, all at 10569 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (2001); J. Hauser,
Note, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 560 (2001); and J. Pradel, La
seconde mort de l'enfant conçu, RECUEIL DALLOZ 2907 (2001). In July 1995, a
vehicle being driven by Mr. Z, who was intoxicated, collided with a vehicle
being driven by Mrs. X, who was six months pregnant. She was injured and as a
result of the impact lost the foetus she was carrying.
J. Pradel, Note, Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle, 25 juin 2002,
RECUEIL DALLOZ 3099 (2002); M.-L. Rassat, Note, 10155 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE
(2002); and Y. Mayaud, Note, REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE 95 (2003). The
child’s death was a result of the negligence of both the doctor, in failing to place
the patient, who was beyond term, under closer observation, and of the midwife
in failing to notify an unequivocal anomaly noted when the child’s cardiac
rhythm was recorded.
For a comprehensive analysis see A. Lepage & P. Maistre du Chambon, Les
paradoxes de la protection de la vie humaine, in LES DROITS ET LE DROIT,
MELANGES DEDIES A B. BOULOC 613-650 (Dalloz 2007).
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identity: two Vietnamese women had nearly similar names. One
of them came to the doctor to have her contraceptive coil removed.
The other was six months pregnant and came for a regular check
up. The doctor caused the death of the child the second woman
was carrying by operating on her without performing a prior
clinical examination. The woman who lost her child alleged a
violation of the Convention on the ground that the doctor’s conduct
was not classified as unintentional homicide.
The Court concluded, on July 4th, 2004, that there had been no
violation of article 2 of the Convention 26 because, “the issue of
when the right to life begins comes within the margin of
appreciation which the Court generally considers that States should
enjoy in this sphere, notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of
the Convention, a living instrument which must be interpreted in
the light of present-day conditions.” 27
An author 28 has pointed out the incoherence of this position
saying that a person causing unintentional injury is liable to
criminal prosecution while a person who unintentionally causes the
death of the fetus goes unpunished. He criticized the fact that a
26. Article 2 of the Convention provides: “1. Everyone’s right to life shall
be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in
the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for
which this penalty is provided by law.”
27. ECHR,
Grand
Chamber
§82,
Vo v.
France
case,
July
8th,
2004,
available
at
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Press/2004/July/GrandChamberjudgmentVovFranc
e080704.htm (last visited November 6, 2008).
M. Levinet, Note, 9 LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA COUR EUROPEENNE DES
DROITS DE L'HOMME 97 (F. Sudre et al., PUF, Thémis 2007); J. Sainte-Rose ,
L'enfant à naître: un objet destructible sans destinée humaine, SEMAINE
JURIDIQUE 194 (2004); J.-P. Marguénaud, Les tergiversations de la Cour
européenne des droits de l'Homme face au droit à la vie de l'enfant à naître,
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 799 (2004); and P. Murat, Les frontières
du droit à la vie: l'indécision de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme,
DROIT DE LA FAMILLE 194 (2004).
28. J. Pradel, Note sous Cour de cassation, Chambre criminelle, 2 décembre
2003, RECUEIL DALLOZ 449 (2004). The Criminal Division of the Court of
Cassation has held that a Court of Appeal gave valid reasons for a defendant
guilty of the unintentional homicide of a child who died an hour after her birth
on the day of a road traffic accident in which her mother, who was eight months’
pregnant, was seriously injured, when it held that, by failing to control his
vehicle, the driver had caused the child’s death an hour after birth as a result of
irreversible lesions to vital organs sustained at the moment of impact.
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child who has lived for a few minutes is recognized as having
standing as a victim, whereas a child that dies in utero is ignored
by the law; and the fact that freedom to procreate is less well
protected than freedom to have an abortion. This can be
considered as a surprising result because criminal law is normally
dedicated to the protection of the human being who is vulnerable
and whose life deserves to be protected.
What all these decisions reveal is that criminal law refuses to
acknowledge any distinction between a human being and a person
having a judicial personality. As a result, no protection is given
until a child is born, alive and viable. Louisiana law appears to be
very different since the child to be is considered a person for the
purposes of a wrongful death action against the person which
causes the loss of the fetus. 29
If we now consider the topic of in vitro embryo, we reach the
same impasse. The idea of making a distinction between a person
having legal capacity and a human being is also defeated. It is
therefore difficult to find a relevant protection for embryos in a
state of cryopreservation. We are going to see how the status of in
vitro embryo obliges to set aside all ontological definitions of the
embryo to restrict its to a teleological definition: 30 what is
important is the use intended for the in vitro embryo.
Just before the 1994 bioethics law was enacted, the Conseil
constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) sharply depreciated the
embryo, denying that it can be construed as a sample of humanity.
The issue of the abandoned frozen embryos that cannot be
transferred into a womb was referred to the Council. The law
obliges them to be destroyed after a certain limit of time. The
Constitutional Council stated on July 27th, 1994 that “the legislator
has taken the view that the principle of respect of every human
being from the beginning of life was not applicable to them.” The
relevant provisions were therefore constitutional.31
As a

29. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 26 (West 2008).
30. F. BELLIVIER, Réflexions au sujet de la nature et de l'artifice dans les
lois de bioéthique, 35 PETITES AFFICHES: SPECIAL REVISION DES LOIS
BIOETHIQUE 10 (2005).
31. Decision n° 94-343/344 DC, July 27th, 1994, available at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/lesdecisions/depuis-1958/decisions-par-date/1994/94-343/344-dc/decision-n-94343-344-dc-du-27-juillet-1994.10566.html (last visited November 6, 2008); and
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consequence, the Council acknowledges the existence of a subclass of human beings, expelled from humankind, who does not
deserve the respect due to every human being from the beginning
of life.
Thus, the characterization of the embryo no longer depends
upon its inherent nature. Rather, it relies on the willingness of
another to give it the status and protections of a person. This is
clear from the 1994 bioethics French law, as amended in 2004: 32
“Assisted conception is aimed at responding to parental request of
a couple” (in the French law “couple” refers to married or
unmarried couple made up by the in vitro fertilization patients). 33
The destiny of frozen embryos is closely linked with the existence
and pursuit of the “parental project.” If, for example, parents are
separated or do not want other children, or if one of them dies, then
there is no longer a parental project and the status of embryo is
rendered uncertain. The embryo is either given to another couple
(in accordance with adoption procedures) or used for scientific
research or destroyed after five years in a state of cryopreservation,
if the couple expresses no other possible choice. 34
In vitro embryos have a very ambiguous legal status: on the
one hand, they benefit from full legal protection when they are part
of a parental project. On the other hand, as soon as there is no
such project (e.g. no married couple is willing and able to receive
the in vitro embryo available for adoptive implantation), they count
for nothing. This ambiguous legal status has been confirmed by
the Court of Appeals of Douai in a judgment dated December 6th,
2005. 35 In this case, several embryos belonging to the same couple
had deteriorated because of poor storage conditions (they had been
kept by the hospital in containers with fissures). The Court of
Appeals acknowledged that the hospital was liable for failing to
provide appropriate storage, but reversed the award of damages
that had been granted to the couple (10,000 Euros based on “varied

B. Edelman, Le Conseil constitutionnel et l'embryon, RECUEIL DALLOZ 205
(1995).
32. Law n° 2004-800, August 6th, 2004.
33. Public Health Code, art. L. 2141-2.
34. Id. at art. L. 2141-4.
35. Cour administrative d'appel de Douai, December 6th, 2005, Juris-Data n°
2005-291858 ; and J.-R Binet, L'enfant conçu et le projet parental devant le juge
administratif, DROIT DE LA FAMILLE 14 (2006).
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troubles in their living conditions”) in first instance by the
Administrative Tribunal. The Court of Appeals considered that, in
view of the specific circumstances of the case, the couple’s
parental project had ceased when their embryos had been
destroyed by accident: after the birth of their two daughters born
as a consequence of in vitro fertilization, they had not maintained
any contact with the medical facility where the nine leftover in
vitro embryos were stored.
The European Court of Human Rights emphasized the
dependence of the embryo destiny to the parental project in the
case Evans v. United Kingdom, (first judgment on March 7th, 2006,
and, after the referral of the case to the Grand Chamber, second
judgment on April 10th, 2007 confirming the previous one). 36 The
decision can be transposed to French law, which is close, in some
respects, to the Human Fertilization and Embryology British Act of
1990.
The applicant, Mrs. Evans, had serious pre-cancerous tumors in
both ovaries, requiring their removal. She and her partner were
told that because the tumors were growing slowly, it would be
possible first to extract some eggs for in vitro fertilization (“IVF”).
Mrs. Evans and her partner commenced treatment at the Bath
Assisted Conception Clinic. In May 2002, the relationship broke
down. The future of the embryos was discussed between the
parties. On July 4th, 2002 the partner wrote to the clinic to notify it
of the separation and to demand that the embryos should be
destroyed. The applicant contested some provisions of the Act of
1990, whereby the consent of either party might be withdrawn at
any stage up to the point of implantation of an embryo. She argued
that this rule, which denies her any chance to have geneticallyrelated offspring in view of her medical history, violated her rights
to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the
Convention. 37
36.
ECHR,
March
7th,
1986,
available
at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2006/March/ChamberjudgmentEvansvUnited
Kingdom070306.htm (last visited November 6, 2008).
ECHR,
Grand
chamber, April 10th,
2007,
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html
&highlight=Evans&sessionid=16566852&skin=hudoc-en
(last
visited
November 6, 2008); and B. Mathieu, Note, 10097 SEMAINE JURIDIQUE (2007).
37. “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life.”
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 15, at art. 8.
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On April 10th, 2007, approving the previous judgment, the
Court, sitting as a Grand Chamber, stated that:
Respect for human dignity and free will, as well as a desire
to ensure a fair balance between the parties to IVF
treatment, underlay the legislature's decision to enact
provisions permitting of no exception to ensure that every
person donating gametes for the purpose of IVF treatment
would know in advance that no use could be made of his or
her genetic material without his or her continuing consent.
In addition to the principle at stake, the absolute nature of
the rule served to promote legal certainty and to avoid the
problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency inherent in
weighing, on a case by case basis, entirely
incommensurable interests. 38
Therefore the Grand Chamber stated that, “given the lack of
European consensus on this point, the fact that the domestic rules
were clear and brought to the attention of the applicant and that
they struck a fair balance between the competing interests, there
has been no violation of article 8 of the Convention.” 39
A review of the French provisions and the European case law
on this topic shows that the requirements for recognizing a current
and justifiable parental project limit the possibility of protecting
the embryo’s potential to be born. Indeed, if the in vitro embryo
ceases to be part of a genuine parental project, it becomes a group
of cells that may be used for scientific experiments or disposed by
destruction. Without parental desire, the embryo lacks humanity.
Once more, the gap between Louisiana and European law is
striking. The characterization of the in vitro embryo as “a juridical
person” in the Louisiana Revised Statutes, 40 as surprising as it
38. ECHR, Grand chamber, supra note 36, at § 89.
Even if the Court holds that the conflicting interests of the parties are
“incommensurable” and could not be “weighed, on a case by case basis,” it
nevertheless compares them when considering that “the applicant's right to
respect for the decision to become a parent in the genetic sense should be
accorded greater weight than J.'s right to respect for his decision not to have a
genetically-related child with her” Id. at § 90. See J.-P. Marguénaud, La triste
fin des embryons in vitro du couple séparé: la Cour de Strasbourg, Cour
européenne des droits du Mâle, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 295
(2007).
39. ECHR, Grand chamber, supra note 36, at § 92.
40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:121 (2008).
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could seem from a European perspective, offers effective
protection to this embryo, which is entitled to be represented in a
law suit. To resolve disputes between the potential parents, the
Louisiana law states that “the best interest” of the in vitro embryo
must be the judicial standard. Moreover it is impossible to destroy
it intentionally, without any time limit, even if no parental project
sustains it any more. 41 It seems therefore that under Louisiana
law, frozen embryos are potentially immortal persons. One can
infer from these provisions that in vitro embryos could not be
destroyed in circumstances close to the situation judged by the
European Court of Human Rights in the Evans case.
The French teleological definition of embryo has allowed
scientific research to take place with both public and private funds.
The August 6th, 2004 law enables some research on in vitro
embryos when they are no longer part of a parental project, if the
parents give express consent. As it becomes a scientific material,
the embryo is then to be regarded as a thing. These experiments
are subject to authorization on a case-by-case basis by the
Biomedicine Agency, which controls the interest and the necessity
of such experiments. Around 45 research teams have been allowed
to work on human embryonic stem cells since 2004. 42 In this legal
framework, a testing program on embryo cells aiming at
establishing a chimerical model man/mouse to enable the study of
HIV infection was authorized in 2006. As adult mice were used in
this experiment, the “chimerical model” was not a chimerical
embryo. In this context, law concerning animal experimentation
could be more useful to provide guardrails.
As regards chimerical embryos, the result of mixing cells from
human and animal embryos, the question of their legal statusbe
solved by considering either the legal status of a human embryo or
the legal status of animals, especially animal embryos. Having
discussed the law pertaining to the human embryo, the legal
provisions concerning animal embryos should now be explored.

41. Id. at §9:122 - 133 (2008).
42. Rapport annuel-Bilan des activités, AGENCE DE LA BIOMEDECINE 56-60
(2006), available at www.agence-biomedecine.fr (last visited November 6,
2008).
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II. ANIMAL EMBRYOS
To clarify the legal status of animal embryos, it is first
necessary to summarize the legal status of animals under French
law. That will help us to clarify, in a second step, the peculiar
situation of animal embryos, particularly in texts dealing with
scientific experiments.
A. Legal Status of Animals
In France, animals traditionally belong to the legal category of
things, which includes everything that is not legally a person, a sort
of “default category.” They are mentioned in the French Civil
Code in articles dealing with property, and their legal status
apparently remains unchanged since 1804. 43 This remains the
leading position among French scholars. The utilitarian theories of
Jeremy Bentham 44 or Peter Singer, 45 as well as the theory of
animal rights developed by Tom Regan, 46 have few echoes in
France.
Nevertheless, some contemporary French scholars hold that
animals have rights and should be treated as legal persons.47 Some
of them are lawyers and base this view on a mere technical
conception of legal personality. They consider that an animal has
such rights because it possesses its “own legally protected
interest,” which is the criterion of a “subject of rights”–the
theoretical analogon of the legal person–according to Ihering. 48
These authors stress the fact that the right to freely use a good–a
43. French Civil Code, art. 522, 524 & 528.
44. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (Adamant Media Corporation 2005) (1789).
45. P. SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT
OF ANIMALS (Random House 1975); P. SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (Cambridge
University Press 1979); and THE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY BEYOND
HUMANITY (P. Cavalieri & P. Singer eds., Saint-Martin’s Press 1994).
46. T. REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS, (University of California
Press 1983).
47. G. CHAPOUTIER, LES DROITS DE L’ANIMAL, (PUF, collection “Que saisje?”, 1992); J.-P. MARGUENAUD, L’ANIMAL EN DROIT PRIVE (Preface Cl.
Lombois, Presses Universitaires de France 1992); and S. ANTOINE, LE DROIT DE
L’ANIMAL, (Préface J.-M. Coulon, Légis-France 2007).
48. R. VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END, (I. Husik trans., The
Boston Book Company 1913) (1877).
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concept that flows from the strong protection of property
developed since the 1789 revolution–cannot be applied as such to
animals. Indeed, the right to use is nowadays limited by criminal
law: ill-treatments and cruelty towards animals are banned. 49
Similarly, the right to decide freely is limited and affected by the
incrimination of abandoning or provoking voluntary death of
animals without any necessity. 50 According to this opinion, as
animals are protected (through criminal law) even against their
owner, they should no longer be characterized as things or as
goods. 51
Some choices made by the French Parliament may support this
view. For instance, legally registered associations promoting
animal protection have been authorized, since 1976, 52 to sue as
victims in certain criminal proceedings concerning animals illtreatments or cruelty toward animals. 53 Furthermore, in 1999, a
technical, but symbolic and legally far-reaching choice was made:
the French Parliament decided to move criminal offences against
animals from a part of the Penal Code entitled “Infringements on
possessions” to another part entitled “Other crimes and offences.”
At the same time, articles defining goods in the Civil Code have
been rewritten to make explicit reference to animals, and no more
only to “objects” or “things.” From then on, one can read that
“animals and things that the owner of a tenement placed thereon
for the use and working of the tenement are immovable by
destination,” 54 and that “animals and things which can move from
one place to another, whether they move by themselves, or whether
they can move only as the result of an extraneous power, are
movables by their nature.” 55 Beyond the vocabulary, this appeared
as an important shift for some scholars that were tempted interpret
as a clear distinction between animals and “objects” or “things.”
49. French Penal Code, art. R. 654-1 and art. 521-1.
50. Id. at art. 521-1 and art. R. 655-1.
51. See C. Daigueperse, L’animal, sujet de droit: réalité de demain, 1er
Sem. GAZ. PAL. 160 (1981); J.-P. Marguénaud, L’animal dans le nouveau Code
pénal, RECUEIL DALLOZ 187 (1995); and J.-P. Marguénaud, La personnalité
juridique des animaux, RECUEIL DALLOZ 205 (1998).
52. Act n° 76-629, July 10th, 1976, JORF July 13th, 1976.
53. The French system allows victims to bring their civil claim in damages
before criminal courts, where they are referred as the partie civile (civil party).
54. French Civil Code, art. 524 (redaction Act n° 99-5, January 6th, 1999).
55. Id. at art 528.
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Nevertheless, one must observe that the new version of the text
leaves animals in the legal category of goods, movable or
immovable when by destination.
Recently, the Act of March 5th, 2007 concerning the prevention
of delinquency also modified several articles of the Penal Code
dealing with additional penalties in order to include express
references to animals. To be precise, the articles concerning the
confiscation of things used or intended to be used for the
commission of an offence (or the confiscation of things which are
the product of an offence) were rewritten to make explicit
reference to animals. In doing so, the Parliament gives the
impression that the expression “things which were used or
intended for the commission of an offence” does not cover
animals, for instance dangerous dogs used to fear a victim. But,
before this modification, courts applied these texts without any
problems. Obviously, such modifications create more doubts than
clarifications about the legal status of animals.
However, the opinion that animals should be considered as
legal persons cannot prevail. Indeed, under current French law,
animals can still be appropriated and general solutions applicable
to goods and things are applied to animals, except when a specific
provision rules them out. The existence of specific texts regarding
animal protection or animal welfare 56 are not incompatible with
the traditional legal status of animals, as long as animals are still
legally treated as objects, things or goods. Besides, unlike Swiss
or German law which textually states that animals are not things, 57
no French law explicitly extracted animals from the category of
goods. On this point, French legislation may appear more
coherent, as Swiss and German law on property are still applicable
to animals in the absence of a specific legal solution. French
jurisprudence is even clearer than the legislation. If a few courts in
the 1980s were tempted to adopt some new opinion, for example
by applying family law concerning children to animals, the Court
of Cassation censured these minority decisions. 58
56. Specific texts most of the time collected in the French Penal Code, in
the French Rural Code, and in the French Environmental Code.
57. See BGB, art. 90, and Swiss Civil Code, art. 641a. See also S.
ANTOINE, RAPPORT SUR LE REGIME JURIDIQUE DE L’ANIMAL (Ministère de la
Justice, May 10th, 2005).
58. See A. Couret, Observation, Cour de cassation, Civ. 1ère, 8 oct. 1980,
RECUEIL DALLOZ 261 (1981).
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Therefore, the confusing elements described below, as regards
the Penal and the Civil codes, do not really change the situation.
Despite the academics debate, and beyond the lexical sliding,
animals remain goods, and therefore things, in French law. This
must be taken into account to better understand the status of animal
embryos.
B. Legal Status of Animal Embryos
The legal status of animal embryos raises less debate. For
those who consider that animals are goods, and therefore things,
animal embryos shall all the more be defined as things (or objects).
For the others, the “own interest” of an animal embryo appears
difficult to outline. Law concerning the property of fruits or the
“right of accession” reinforces the conclusion that animal embryos
are things. Indeed, under the civil law tradition–in French law as
in the Louisiana Civil Code–, in the absence of rights of other
persons, the owner of a thing acquires the ownership of its natural
fruits, and this solution is applicable to animals. The young of
animals belong to the owner of the mother. 59 In this legal
framework, the animal embryo is legally a fruit, produced by a
thing, and therefore belonging to the legal category of things.
However, defining animals as things does not imply absolute
freedom of action with animals. Numerous specific texts were
adopted to protect animals by prohibiting bad behavior or by
requiring the assent of administrative procedures. And it is
important to notice that some of these texts are applicable to
animal embryos. For instance, in its articles dealing with animals
used for scientific purposes, the French Rural Code covers all
vertebrates, including at the embryonic stage, except embryonic
forms of vertebrates oviparous (egg laying). 60 Such an exception
shows that French law does not apply the same solution for all the
animal embryos: some of them are things and objects of free
disposal, which is the case for invertebrate embryos and oviparous
59. French Civil Code, arts. 547 and 548 (Natural fruit: increase in stock
belong to the owner by right of accession; Fruit produced by a thing belong to
the owner only on condition that he repays the costs of ploughing, works and
seeds incurred by third parties and whose value must be assessed at the date of
repayment); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 483 & 484 (West 2008).
60. French Rural Code, art. R. 214-87.
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embryos; others are also things but are protected by special texts
limiting the freedom of the owner or the holder in an experimental
context, which is the case for vertebrate viviparous embryos.
Beyond the question of the legal status of the animal embryos,
this difference influences the conditions in which experiments can
take place. When scientists want to use viviparous embryos, they
must comply with administrative constraints. The French Rural
Code requires a license for institutions where experiments take
place and for persons who realize them. Except for the case of
simple observations requiring no intervention or suffering,
scientists are required to obtain a personal authorization. Licenses
and authorizations are delivered by civil servants working for local
veterinarian services.
Since 2001, controls cover research
protocols.
If the experimental protocols are not in fact
systematically checked one by one, scientists who ask for a
personal authorization to experiment with protected animals for
five years must explain the aim of their research. They also have
to justify the reasons why they need to use a certain sort of animals
and to assure that there is no alternative solution. Lastly, they must
set measures to limit animal suffering.
Though technical, such data are of great importance for a study
on mixing human and animal elements in order to create
chimerical embryos. They show that controls exist for scientists
and establishments where experiments take place on viviparous
embryos. They also show that it is easier to work on oviparous
embryos, because in this case scientists do not have to work in a
licensed institution or to obtain a personal authorization to
experiment, and so avoid controls.
All these information is important to anticipate questions about
the legal status of chimerical embryos. What can be the legal
status of this puzzling inter-species creature? In view of the
relative and uncertain status of human embryos in French law, and
taking into account the legal framework regarding animal
experimentation, answering this question is likely to be a real
challenge.
III. CHIMERICAL EMBRYOS
French law is mute about “chimeras” or “chimerical embryos.”
No definitions or specific solutions have been adopted. The
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question of the legal status of a chimerical embryo, mixing human
and animal cells, has no clear answer. Therefore, French lawyers
must use basic legal solutions and make conjectures.
Despite this first observation, a close examination of French
law reveals a clue. This lies in article L. 611-17 of the French
Intellectual Property Code, which holds that “Inventions shall be
considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation
would be inconsistent to human dignity, order public or morality;
however, such inconsistency may not emanate from a prohibition
by law or regulation.” This text is the transposition into French
law of article 6 of the European Directive of July 6th, 1998 on the
legal protection of biotechnological inventions. 61 Article 6 states
that:
1) inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their
commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public
or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to
be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or
regulation; 2) On the basis of this, the following, in
particular, shall be considered unpatentable: (a) processes
for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the
germ line genetic identity of human beings; (c) uses of
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; (d)
processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals
which are likely to cause them suffering without any
substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also
animals resulting from such processes. 62
How to relate this solution to our quest? The answer is in the
preamble of the Directive. Indeed, the “whereas” (or
“considering”) number thirty eight of the preamble of the Directive
brings some information about the correct interpretation of article
6. It specifies that “the operative part of this Directive should also
include an illustrative list of inventions excluded from patentability
so as to provide national courts and patent offices with a general

61. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
July 6th, 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, OJ L 213,
http://eur30.7.1998,
at
13-21,
available
at
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:213:0013:0021:EN:P
DF (last visited November 6, 2008).
62. Directive 98/44/EC, article 6.
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guide to interpreting the reference to ordre public and morality,” 63
that “this list obviously cannot presume to be exhaustive,” 64 and
that “processes, the use of which offend against human dignity,
such as processes to produce chimeras from germ cells or
totipotent cells of humans and animals, are obviously also
excluded from patentability.” 65
This late precision provides a precious, but perhaps flimsy,
clue. The legal force of a preamble of a European directive is
subject to discussion. Nevertheless, this text has been written to
help interpreters of the Directive. As article L. 611-17 of the
French Intellectual Property Code transposes article 6 of the
Directive, it is acceptable to read the French text in the light of the
preamble of the Directive. In doing so, one can hold that a process
to produce a chimerical embryo created from germ cells or
totipotent cells of human and animals would not be patentable.
Going one step further in our interpretation, one could consider
that a chimerical embryo from germ cells or totipotent cells of
human and animals would not be patentable. This supported
opinion should convince. But it is a debatable conclusion. French
Courts, French and European Patent Offices could find in the
Stuart Newman’s decision of the United States Patent Trade Office
another reason to choose this interpretation.
In 1987, cell biologist Stuart Newman, in collaboration with
biotech-activist Jeremy Rifkin, filed a patent application for a
“chimera,” described as a “mammalian embryo developed from a
mixture of embryo cells, embryo cells and embryonic stem cells, or
embryonic stem cells exclusively, in which at least one of the cells
is derived from a human embryo, a human embryonic stem cell
line, or any other type of human cell, and any cell line, developed
embryo, or animal derived from such an embryo.” 66 Newman and
Rifkin hoped through the application either to obtain a patent, and
thus to be able to block anyone else from developing a human63. Id. at preamble (considering 38).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Dec. Stuart Newman,
Application n° 10/308, 135, Art unit n° 1632. See about this decision, M.-A.
Hermitte, Bioéthique et brevets dans le droit du commerce international: la
construction d’un nouveau contrat social, in LA COMMUNAUTE
INTERNATIONALE ET LES ENJEUX BIOETHIQUES 111 (S. Maljean-Dubois dir.,
Pédone 2005).
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animal chimera for twenty years, or to provoke the denial of the
patent, and thus to get the Patent Office to take a clear stand
against the patenting of chimeras. The 2003 final decision in the
Newman applications is largely based on traditional patent
requirements. The decision, for example, notes that the Newman
application fails to describe adequately how the applicant intends
to produce a chimera; that to the extent that it does describe how to
accomplish its ends it merely duplicates already published
processes.
But, in a more interesting way, the Patent Office
asserted its position that human beings are not patentable subject
matter. The Patent Office said that “a proportion of non human
cells do not negate the human’s status as a human, nor does
alteration by human intervention. Thus, it is clear from a reading
of the claims in view of the specification and in view of the art that
the breadth of the claimed invention includes ‘humans’.” 67 In his
report, the examiner also developed that, under United States
patent law, only “useful process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter” 68 may obtain a patent, and that “the term
useful has been construed to include the connotation that an
asserted invention should not be frivolous, or injurious to the wellbeing, good policy, or good morals of society.” 69 In charge of
applying a textual exclusion from patentability for inventions
inconsistent to human dignity, public order or morality, French and
European Patent Offices could adopt a similar position.
Though useful, this information does not answer clearly the
question of the status of such an embryo. It is thus necessary to
question other existing rules to discover possible answers to this
forward-looking issue. For the purpose of our thought, three basic
working hypotheses have to be envisaged, depending on the legal
status of the elements mixed to create the chimera.
In a first hypothesis, one could consider that a human embryo
even in vitro is a person (or a subject of rights in French legal
terminology), unlike an animal embryo. Concerning human
embryos, this hypothesis is less relevant according to French law
than to other civil legal systems such as Louisiana law. In this
context, several options are conceivable. In order to provide a
maximal protection to human embryos, a solution consists in
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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considering that a chimerical embryo is legally a human embryo,
and consequently a legal person, though it is only partially
biologically human. On the contrary, one could suggest that the
mixture of DNA disqualifies the embryo as a human embryo, and
that the new creature is just a new type of genetically modified
animal. But others pathways are imaginable. One could, for
instance, make reference to the civilian rules concerning “principal
and accessories” or composite things. In the civil legal tradition, to
characterize a thing as accessory means that the accessory may
follow the principal thing. In this view, the embryo essentially
constituted by genetically human material (more than 50 percent)
would be characterized as human embryo, and thus as “subject of
rights.” It would be the case, for instance, of the human embryo in
the brain of which animal neuronal cells would have been injected.
On the contrary, embryos not presenting this characteristic would
belong to the category of animal embryos and would be mere
things. Another possibility lies in paying attention to the DNA of
sex cells. With this solution, for instance, a duck embryo of which
brain would have been partially colonized by human neurons
would not be protected at all. Last but not least, one could propose
to create or recognize a new specific category, but no information
is available about what rules would be applicable.
In a second hypothesis, one could consider both human and
animal embryos as legal persons. This hypothesis is not relevant to
current French or Louisiana law. Nevertheless, it is still interesting
to notice that the characterization of human embryos and animal
embryos as persons does not imply that the same rules would be
necessarily applicable to them. In the legal category of persons,
different regimes may coexist. For instance, juristic persons and
natural persons have a name, a domicile, a nationality and a
patrimony, but juristic persons do not need physical protection or
matrimony rules. So, it is still necessary to decide if the chimerical
embryo would be treated as a human embryo, as an animal
embryo, or as a new kind of person subject to new rules.
In a third hypothesis, one could consider human embryos in
vitro and animal embryos as legal things. In such a view, which is
more convincing under current French law than the Louisiana Civil
Code, the mixture of human and animal embryos would inevitably
fall into the category of things. At this point, two reasons would
oblige a lawyer or a judge to determine the applicable rules: first,
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as already explained, different solutions apply to human embryos
and to animal embryos; second, different rules apply to oviparous
or viviparous embryos. Undoubtedly, juridical imagination would
be tested, and maybe hounded into a corner.
To go further, it would also be necessary to address the
problem of a possible development of such a chimerical embryo
into the womb of a woman or a female, and the problem of its
birth. As a matter of fact, most of the time, the status of children
or offspring depends on the status of the mother or the female
which gave birth. The final paragraph of article L. 2151-5 of the
French Public Health Code states that human “embryos on which
research has been carried out may not be transferred for the
purpose of gestation.” Using the traditional techniques of
interpretation, it is easy to conclude that a fortiori, a chimerical
embryo may not be implanted. However, the fact that this is the
only reasonable interpretation cannot prevent that the legal
prohibition might be trespassed one day.
Moreover, the possibility of using human somatic cells to
create a chimerical embryo complicates the task. Would a
chimerical embryo produced from human somatic cells and animal
embryonic cells be characterized as a human embryo (which is
related to the concept of “potential human person” as seen before)?
It seems very problematic. Would it be legally treated as a
chimerical embryo created with human embryonic stem cells?
Probably not: as it has been previously explained, the use of human
embryos for experimental purposes is strictly limited by specific
rules only applicable to human embryos. Yet, supervising
scientific research under serious regulations appears to be an
important matter, even when human embryonic stem cells are not
used.
To complete this rapid overview, let us add that a human
embryo cannot be characterized as a genetically modified organism
under current French law, whereas an animal to which some
human genes were added can be a genetically modified organism.
Since 1990, France (as other member states of the European
Community) submits experiments on genetically modified
organisms to special authorizations. It is a whole field of new
questions that thus has to be investigated.
The range of genomic mixtures leads to infinite questions.
Science moves forward and scientific curiosity is boundless.
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Several scientists consider experiments mixing human and animal
elements as tools to make advance knowledge on early human
development. According to them, this could lead to a better
understanding of genetic diseases and to new medical treatments.
Consequently, experiments creating chimeras will probably be
attempted all around the world. Unaware of the situation or
underestimating the consequences, lawyers often ignore these
questions. Yet, very few answers are available in our legal system.
It is time to become conscious and to face these new questions.
The answers to come will be all the more relevant as the questions
will have been anticipated and the possible solutions submitted to
discussion.
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